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Summary
Anoptimal correspondenceof temporal informationbetween
the physical world and our perceptual world is important for
survival. In the current study, we demonstrate a novel
temporal illusion in which the cause of a perceptual event is
perceived after the event itself. We used a paradigm referred
to asmotion-inducedblindness (MIB), inwhicha static visual
target presented on a constantly rotating background dis-
appears and reappears from awareness periodically [1–3],
with the dynamic characteristics of bistable perception [4].
A sudden stimulus onset (e.g., a flash) presented during
aperiodofperceptual suppression (i.e., duringMIB) is known
to trigger the almost instantaneous reappearance of the
suppressed target [5]. Surprisingly, however, we report here
that although the sudden flash is the cause of the static
target’s reappearance (the corresponding effect), it is sys-
tematically perceived as occurring after this reappearance.
Further investigation revealed that this illusory temporal
reversal is caused by anw100 ms advantage for the uncon-
scious representation of the perceptually suppressed target
to access consciousness, as compared to the newly pre-
sented flash. This new temporal illusion therefore reveals
the normally hidden delays in bringing new visual events to
awareness.
Results
Experiment 1
Motion-Induced Blindness Session
The occurrence and duration of motion-induced blindness
(MIB) were recorded in three separate sessions (pretest, test,
and posttest). In the pretest session, participants (n = 7)
reported the onset of subjective disappearance and reappear-
ance of a ring target on a trial-by-trial basis with key presses
and releases, respectively (for details, see Experimental
Procedures). For each participant, we obtained a distribution
of MIB durations, ranging from a few hundred milliseconds
to several seconds, and we extracted the first quartile of this
distribution (PreQ25; mean 6 standard error of the mean
[SEM] = 631 6 45 ms). In the test session, within each trial
we flashed a dot probe (50 ms duration) inside the static ring
target after its subjective disappearance at the exact time
delay given by the individual PreQ25 for the tested subject
(Figures 1A–1C). For w25% of trials, this probe should thus
arrive after the ring has perceptually reappeared. For the
remaining 75%, we confirmed that the probe tended to bring
about the ring’s reappearance within a short delay [5]:*Correspondence: rufin.vanrullen@cerco.ups-tlse.frcompared with the pretest distribution, the test distribution
of MIB durations was evidently shortened (c2(14) = 115.7,
p < 1026; Figure 1C). After each trial, we asked participants
whether they had perceived the probe onset (perceptual
cause) or the ring reappearance (perceptual effect) first
(Figures 1A and 1B). By design, the expected percentage of
ring-first responses should have been w25%. Strikingly,
however, on average participants reported the ring first on
90% (65% SEM) of trials. Evidently, the perceived temporal
sequence of events was the reverse of the expected
sequence, so that, in awareness, the perceptual cause (probe
onset) lagged behind its effect (ring reappearance). In the
posttest session, we verified that the participants’ distribu-
tions of MIB durations had not changed in any systematic
way relative to the pretest (c2(17) = 4.98, not significant [NS]),
thus ruling out practice as an explanation for the shortened
MIB durations in the test session.
What could explain the observed temporal lag? Did we
simply overestimate the duration of PreQ25 and present the
dot probe too late? For example, motor delays between the
perceptual disappearance of the ring and its actual report
could have contributed to increasing the likelihood of ring-first
responses. However, in order to account for 90% ring-first
percepts, the extent of that overestimation would have had
to be at least 1350 ms (the time difference between PreQ90
and PreQ25; Figure 1C), a value unlikely to be explained by
motor delays.
Control Session
Is this phenomenon specific to perceptually suppressed but
physically present stimuli, or would the same effect occur
with a ring that physically disappears from the screen? In
a control experiment (with a static background that did not
induce MIB), we evaluated participants’ temporal order judg-
ment between a ring onset and a probe onset in a reappear-
ance session (designed to simulate the experimental
sequence of the test session, but with an actual removal of
the ring) and an appearance session (serving as a baseline,
without any prior exposure to the ring). In both cases, the stim-
ulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the ring’s physical
onset and the probe onset (ring-probe SOA) was varied across
trials. Psychometric functions for temporal order judgment
(see Experimental Procedures) were used to determine the
individual point of subjective simultaneity (PSS): the SOA
leading to 50% ring-first responses (Figure 1D). The PSS
values for each participant (n = 5) were subjected to a t test
against 0 ms. The mean PSS (6 SEM) was 21.1 6 4.2 ms for
the reappearance session (t4 = 20.26, NS), and 6.5 6 7.1 ms
for the appearance session (t4 = 0.91, NS), which did not differ
significantly from 0 ms. The fact that temporal order judgments
were accurate in both conditions implies that no significant
perceptual processing bias existed between the dot probe
and the target ring that could have caused a temporal advan-
tage for the ring. Furthermore, a preview followed by physical
disappearance of the ring was not sufficient to induce
a temporal reversal. In other words, the temporal illusion
obtained in the MIB experiment appears to be a specific prop-
erty of stimuli that are physically present but temporarily
rendered invisible.
Figure 1. The Illusory Temporal Reversal Phenomenon:
Experiment 1
(A) Experimental sequence. Participants performed three
sessions. In both the pretest and posttest sessions, they
pressed a button when the static ring disappeared from
awareness, held the button, and released it when the ring
perceptually reappeared. The corresponding first quartile
of the distribution of motion-induced blindness (MIB) dura-
tions in the pretest session (PreQ25) was used as the time
delay for probe onset in the test session (illustrated here),
where, in addition to the MIB responses, participants indi-
cated whether the ring reappearance or the probe onset
was perceived first.
(B) Perceived sequence. Based on the nature of the design,
the expected percentage of ring-first responses should
have been w25%. Strikingly, however, an average of 90%
ring-first responses was observed. In other words, partici-
pants perceived the ring target reappearance before they
perceived the flash probe. Note that there need not be a direct
temporal correspondence between the individual frames
illustrating the experimental (A) and perceived (B) sequences.
The basic phenomenon is also demonstrated online at http://
www.cerco.ups-tlse.fr/wrufin/illusoryreversaldemo.
(C) Averaged histograms of MIB duration. Here we plot the
histogram of MIB durations defined as the time length (ms)
between target reappearance and disappearance for the
pretest (blue), test (red), and posttest (green) sessions. All
participants’ MIB duration distributions were first aligned to
their corresponding PreQ25 before averaging. Confirming
results from Kawabe et al. [5], distributions before the probe
onset were similar across sessions, but in the test session the
probe presentation usually triggered the reappearance of the
ring, as indicated by the narrowing of the distribution after
probe onset (i.e., PreQ25). The gray dotted line indicates the
time at which the probe would have needed to be presented,
according to the pretest distribution, to account for the
observed 90% ring-first percepts (i.e., the 90th percentile of
the pretest distribution). Transparent shaded areas represent
standard error of the mean (SEM).
(D) Psychometric functions for temporal order judgment in the control sessions. Averaged data from each session in the control experiment were fitted with
a cumulative normal distribution. The percentage of ring-first responses is plotted as a function of ring-probe stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; positive values
indicate that the ring reappeared earlier than the probe onset). The purple curve is the result from the reappearance session, in which the ring physically dis-
appeared and reappeared with a delay, mimicking the sequence in the main MIB experiment. The light-blue curve is the result from the appearance session, in
which the ring and the probe were simply presented with a variable time SOA (without previous exposure of the ring). No systematic bias in temporal order
judgment between probe and ring onsets was observed in either session. Note that, based on the psychometric curves of these two control experiments, the
observed 90% ring-first responses in the MIB experiment would correspond to a temporal offset bias ofw110 ms, as indicated by the black dotted line.
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The observed 90% ring-first responses indicate a robust
temporal advantage for the reappearance of the perceptually
suppressed ring target as compared to the newly presented
flash probe. Based on the fitted psychometric function from
the control session in experiment 1, 90% ring-first responses
could correspond to a temporal offset bias of at leastw110 ms
in favor of the ring target (Figure 1D). There are two logical
alternatives to account for this temporal advantage: either
the flash probe is perceived too late compared to its normal
perceptual latency because it is presented during a perceptu-
ally suppressed period (the illusion would thus have affected
the probe), or the existing unconscious ring representation
was perceived with a shortened latency (the illusion would
thus have affected the ring target). We tested the first alterna-
tive by comparing the perceptual latency of the flash probe to
that of another flash probe presented at a different location,
outside of MIB. In this experiment, two rings were presented
in opposite hemifields on a rotating background, and the
observers (n = 4) monitored the two locations while only
reporting disappearance of the left ring (MIB). They were
instructed to reject any trial in which the right ring had also dis-
appeared, even briefly. At a fixed time (500 ms) after the onsetof MIB, a flash probe was presented in each ring, and subjects
reported the perceived order of appearance of the two probes.
The delay between the onsets of the two probes was adjusted
according to a QUEST procedure [6] to determine the PSS. The
mean PSS (6 SEM) was29.56 12.0 ms. This was not different
from a control condition in which the background did not
rotate (so that no MIB could occur), and the same subjects
reported a mean PSS of 26.8 6 9.9 ms between the left and
the right flash probes. In summary, the processing of the probe
at the MIB location was not delayed compared to its normal
perceptual latency; instead, the results support the second
of the above-mentioned alternatives, i.e., that the preexisting
ring representation in the unconscious stream was reactivated
in the conscious stream faster than normal—and faster than it
takes a newly presented probe to reach consciousness.
Experiment 3
In order to directly quantify the temporal advantage of the
perceptually suppressed ring, we modified the test session
from experiment 1 by introducing a nonsalient color change
of the ring target (Figures 2A and 2B; see also Experimental
Procedures) that occurred at various SOAs relative to the
onset of the flash probe (ColorChange-Probe SOA). At the
Figure 2. Measuring the Extent of the Temporal Reversal: Experiment 3
(A) Experimental sequence for the 0 ms ColorChange-Probe SOA condition. As in experiment 1, each participant performed a pretest session to determine
his or her corresponding PreQ25 for the test session. In the test session, a flash probe was again presented at the PreQ25 to trigger an early reappearance of
the ring target. Furthermore, the color of the ring target was changed with varied SOA relative to the onset of the probe (2300, 2150, 0, 150, 300 ms, with
negative SOAs referring to color changes that occurred before the probe onset). Here we present the trial sequence for the 0 ms ColorChange-Probe SOA
condition. At the end of each trial, participants responded to two questions: first, whether the ring reappearance or the probe onset was perceived first, and
second, whether at ring reappearance they perceived the old or the new color first.
(B) Perceived sequence. In a typical trial, participants perceived that the ring target reappearance occurred earlier than the probe onset; furthermore, the
ring target reappeared first with the old color and then changed to the new color. Note that the color change per se did not trigger early target reappearance
(see Figure S1A for more detailed evidence).
(C) Psychometric functions for color judgment in the MIB and control session in experiment 3. Averaged data of color judgments from the MIB and the
control sessions were fitted with a cumulative normal distribution. The percentage of old color responses is plotted as a function of ColorChange-Probe
SOA (negative values indicate that the color change occurred earlier than the probe onset). The red curve is the result from the MIB session, in which
the ring changed its color with varied SOA relative to the probe onset while participants experienced MIB. The blue curve is the result from the control
session, in which the ring changed its color with varied SOA relative to the probe onset without any MIB (i.e., the background was not rotating and the
ring was always visible). For the control session, there is no perceptual bias toward either the old or the new color when the color change occurs simulta-
neously with the probe onset. For the MIB session, however, there appears to be a perceptual bias toward the old color. In other words, the color change
would need to have occurredw100 ms before the probe onset for participants to show no perceptual bias toward either color.
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tions: first, whether the ring reappearance or the probe onset
was perceived first, as in experiment 1 (on average, partici-
pants made 76% 6 5% ring-first responses, a value which
qualitatively replicated the illusory temporal reversal observed
in experiment 1), and second, what color the ring was when it
first reappeared (old or new color). By plotting the color choice
probability (i.e., old or new) as a function of ColorChange-
Probe SOA, we could determine the moment at which the
unconscious ring representation was updated into awareness.
All participants also performed a similar color judgment
(serving as a baseline) in a control session in which no MIB
was induced (i.e., the background was not rotating), and the
participants reported the perceived color of the ring at the
time of the flash probe onset.
Figure 2C illustrates the psychometric curves for the color
judgment as a function of ColorChange-Probe SOAs for the
MIB session and the control session. Although in the control
session, there was no color perception bias (50% 6 5%
SEM) at 0 ms SOA, during the MIB session, participants were
biased toward reporting the old color on 65% of trials on
average (66% SEM). Again, we obtained individual PSSs (the
SOA leading to 50% old-color responses) that were used to
quantify the temporal delay responsible for the observed color
perception bias. The mean PSS (6 SEM) for the MIB session
(2122 6 29 ms) was significantly different from the mean PSSfor the control session (214 6 14 ms, t9 = 3.37, p < 0.005,
one-tail). Thus, the color change would need to have occurred
on average 108 ms before the probe onset for participants to
perceive the two events as simultaneous. In other words, after
the flash probe triggered the ring reappearance, the first ring
color that participants tended to perceive was the color of
the ring as it had beenw100 ms before the flash probe onset.
Most importantly, the magnitude of this temporal delay fits well
with the finding from experiment 1 of a temporal advantage of
at least 110 ms for the perceptually suppressed ring target as
compared to the new probe.
We also verified that, as in experiment 1, the probe tended to
bring about the ring’s reappearance [5] (see Figure S1B avail-
able online); in contrast, the nonsalient color change by itself
had no effect on the ongoing MIB (Figure S1A).
Experiment 4
Does the temporal illusion depend on the mismatch between
the perceptual time courses of two distinct objects (the ‘‘old’’
ring and the ‘‘new’’ probe), or could it also be obtained for
a single object as a result of the temporal mismatch between
its representations at the conscious and unconscious levels?
To address this, we modified the test session from experiment
3 by introducing a salient color change of the ring target to
trigger the early reappearance of the target without the need
for a flash probe (Figure 3; see also Experimental Procedures).
Figure 3. Color Change Acting as the Probe Event: Experi-
ment 4
(A) Experimental sequence. Again, each participant per-
formed a pretest session to determine his or her correspond-
ing PreQ25 for the test session. In the test session, instead of
a probe, we changed the ring target to another salient color
at the corresponding PreQ25 to trigger an early reappearance
of the ring target. At the end of each trial, participants
responded to a single question: whether, at ring reappear-
ance, they perceived the old or the new color first.
(B) Perceived sequence. On average, for 63% of trials, partic-
ipants perceived the old color first when the ring target
reappeared from MIB.
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but rather only old versus novel features of a preexisting
object. As before, the salient color change occurred at the cor-
responding PreQ25 determined by each participant’s pretest
session. At the end of each trial, participants (n = 6) reported
which color (old or new) they had first perceived when the
ring target reappeared from MIB; by design, one would thus
expectw25% of old-color responses.
As in experiments 1 and 3, the probe event (here, the color
change) triggered the reappearance of the target (Figure S2).
Furthermore, when the target reappeared from MIB, it was first
perceived by the participants with its old color in 63%6 6% of
trials on average, instead of the expectedw25%. This result is
remarkable, because in most trials it was the switch to the new
color that triggered the perceptual reappearance of the ring;
that is, the new color of the ring must have first been registered
by the visual system at the unconscious level, which resulted in
the conscious reappearance of a ring clad in its old color.
Experiment 5
To generalize our conclusions to other types of perceptual
suppression, we also tested the phenomenon during binocular
rivalry. Following the same logic as during the MIB experiment,
we presented a probe to trigger an early switch of dominant
percepts between two eyes. In this case, the illusory temporal
reversal (i.e., perceiving the switch before perceiving the
probe) was present, but with a reduced magnitude (for details,
see Figure S3), suggesting that the level of perceptual
suppression may be different from that of MIB.
Discussion
In thecurrentstudy,wepresentconverging evidence foranovel
temporal illusion: a visual stimulus (e.g., a ring) temporarily
outside the realm of consciousness (i.e., during MIB) can be
perceived to reappear before the event (e.g., a flash) that trig-
gers its reappearance, leading to an illusory temporal reversal
of cause and effect. Our results further suggest that this illusory
temporal reversal is caused by an w100 ms temporal advan-
tage for updating the conscious representation from the
preexisting unconscious representation of the perceptually
suppressed static target, as compared to the newly presented
sudden flash. This illusion adds to a number of previous reportsin which the temporal order between events in the
real world was shown to disagree with the corre-
sponding perceived order [7–16].
In our case, the fact that illusory reversals only
occur after one of the two stimuli has been
perceptually suppressed has strong implicationsfor the mechanisms of conscious perception in the brain. We
reported a temporal advantage ofw100 ms for updating a pre-
existing unconscious representation to conscious awareness,
as compared to consciously perceiving an entirely new stim-
ulus (experiments 1–3) or a new feature of the existing stimulus
(experiment 4). This temporal advantage suggests that there
normally exists an integration period of at least 100 ms before
new stimuli can enter consciousness. Although this integration
period is consistent with a purely feed-forward model of
conscious vision, another class of theories that could explain
the phenomenon invokes feedback or reentry of neural signals
after the first feed-forward sweep for a stimulus to be
consciously perceived [17, 18]. Accordingly, MIB or rivalry
suppression would block reentry signals and thus prevent
awareness. In this view, feed-forward processing of the probe
would trigger the reentry of the preexisting representation of
the target, which is temporally blocked from being consciously
perceived, while the compulsory reentry of the probe (and/or
of the color change) would delay its perceptual awareness,
resulting in an illusory reversal. Even though this theory is
clearly not the only possible way of explaining our results, the
observed w100 ms temporal advantage in our data fits well
with the suggestion that the key recurrent processing for
conscious perception occurs inw100 ms [18, 19].
In any case, the novel illusory phenomenon reported here
suggests that on the way to consciousness, ‘‘out of sight’’
can lag ‘‘out of mind’’ by at leastw100 ms.
Experimental Procedures
Information in this section is in summarized form. For more details, see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Experiment 1
Motion-Induced Blindness Session
The display (classic MIB) is illustrated in Figure 1A. In the pretest session,
participants reported the disappearance and reappearance of the ring
trial-by-trial. Accordingly, we obtained a distribution of MIB durations and
extracted its first quartile (PreQ25) for each participant. In the test session,
we flashed a dot probe (50 ms duration) at the location of the ring at the
exact time delay of this first quartile (PreQ25) after the reported onset of
MIB. In addition to reporting the occurrence of MIB as previously, at the
end of each trial participants were also required to judge the perceived
temporal order between the flashed probe and the ring. Finally, a posttest
session (same as the pretest session) ensured that the distribution of
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2007reported MIB durations had remained relatively stable from session to
session.
Control Session
We simulated the experimental sequence of the MIB session with a static
background (i.e., no MIB; the ring physically disappeared and reappeared,
or simply appeared at a given time). Participants judged the temporal order
between the ring appearance/reappearance and the probe onset. Critically,
we varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the ring appear-
ance/reappearance and the probe and determined the point of subjective
simultaneity (PSS) under these control conditions.
Experiment 2
There were two sessions: an MIB session and a control session. In both
sessions, two static ring targets were displayed, one in the upper left visual
field and one in the upper right visual field. In the MIB session, participants
monitored the two locations but only reported the disappearance and reap-
pearance of the left target (trials were rejected when the right target under-
went MIB). At a fixed delay (500 ms) after reported disappearance of the left
ring, a flash probe was presented within each ring with a variable SOA
between the two flash probes. To ensure that the left ring target was still
under the influence of MIB at the corresponding flash probe onset, we
only considered trials in which the reported MIB duration exceeded 600
ms. At the end of each trial, participants judged the temporal order between
the left and right flash probes. The SOA was adjusted online with an adap-
tive staircase procedure (QUEST [6]). In the control session, the procedure
was the same but with a static background (i.e., no MIB).
Experiment 3
Motion-Induced Blindness Session
The display is illustrated in Figure 2A. All procedures were similar to experi-
ment 1. However, in the test session, the color of the ring target was
changed from dark green to dark purple (the color used in the pretest
session) with varied SOAs relative to the probe onset (ColorChange-Probe
SOA: 2300, 2150, 0, 150, 300 ms). For each trial, participants reported (1)
whether the ring reappearance or the probe onset was perceived first and
(2), when the ring reappeared, which color they perceived first (old or new
color).
Control Session
The control session was similar to the test session except that no MIB was
induced (i.e., the background was not rotating).
Experiment 4
The procedures were similar to experiment 1 except that a salient color
change of the ring (from dark green to bright purple) played the role of the
flash probe. For each trial in the test session, participants reported the color
they perceived first when the ring reappeared (i.e., old or new color).
Experiment 5
We applied the same logic as in experiment 1 to a different perceptual
suppression paradigm: binocular rivalry. In this case, an early dominant
percept switch (just like the ring reappearance in experiments 1–4) between
the two eyes was triggered by the flash probe; subjects reported the
perceived temporal order between the dominant percept switch and the
flash probe.Supplemental Data
Supplemental data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures and
three figures and can be found online at http://www.cell.com/
current-biology/supplemental/S0960-9822(09)01836-3.
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